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20 November 1952

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**SUBJECT: NIE-64 (Part II): Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action, through Mid-1953**

**BACKGROUND**

1. This estimate was authorized by the IAC on 13 March, at the suggestion of the Board.
2. While it is less clear-cut than is desirable, it is more precise than earlier estimates on the subject, and is the best obtainable from conferences which, at times, seemed interminable.
3. The G-2 reservation noted on page 16 has been withdrawn.

**SUBSTANCE**

4. As far as we can determine, all agree to the present text, except
5. Dissent. Only dissent is on paragraph 29 of the Discussion. State, joined by G-2, believes the USSR may not be deterred from measures to make the position of the West in Berlin untenable by fear of precipitating global war. The Board, joined by Navy and Air Force, believes the Kremlin must realize that the US could not withdraw from Berlin without a fight, at least before mid-1953.

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